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THE SHIFTING FOUNDATIONS OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
PAUL SCHULTZ 
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME 
MENDOZA COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial regulation in the U.S. and around the world has changed 
dramatically since the 2007-2008 financial crisis. There are many visible 
manifestations of the changes, including Dodd-Frank, Basel III and, other 
laws. In this paper, I will discuss what I believe are two important recent 
changes in our approach to financial regulation and how they are reflected 
in recent laws and in new regulatory authorities. This article will discuss 
both of these changes broadly, but will also focus on how they are reflected 
in regulation by the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 
The first change is an increasing reliance on regulator judgment and 
discretion rather than on hard and specific rules and regulations. Hard rules 
are not disappearing from current regulation; for example, Basel III capital 
requirements and the definition of qualified mortgages are hard rules. But 
recent financial regulation does grant extraordinary discretionary powers to 
regulators. 
The second change is an increasing reliance on behavioral economics to 
motivate and justify regulation. Traditional motivations for financial 
regulation have relied on market failure. Behavioral economics suggests 
that individuals’ inability to make rational and intelligent choices makes 
paternalistic financial regulation desirable. 
THE SHIFT TOWARD INCREASED REGULATOR DISCRETION 
Hard Rules Versus Discretion 
Hard rules are unambiguous rules about what a financial institution or 
market participant must do or cannot do. Both regulators and financial 
institutions know about these rules before actions are taken and know what 
the institution must do to be in compliance. For example, under Basel III, if 
a bank holds sovereign debt from a country with a country risk 
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classification of 4-6, the risk-weighing factor for the debt is 8%. This tells 
both the bank and regulator exactly how much equity capital a bank must 
hold against sovereign debt with this level of risk. There is no ambiguity, 
and the regulatory requirement is known in advance. 
As another example, insiders are defined as a company’s officers, 
directors, and owners of more than 10% of the company’s stock.1 Any sale 
of stock by an insider must be reported to the SEC within two business days 
of the sale. Who qualifies as an insider and what they must do when they 
sell stock is clear in advance.2 
Recently, we have seen a move away from hard rules and toward more 
regulator discretion. Rather than using hard and fast rules that are known in 
advance, regulators are making decisions based on broad regulatory goals 
and their individual judgment. This is not to say rules are not being written 
and enforced—far from it—but regulator discretion seems to be becoming 
more important. 
One familiar example is in the designation of non-banks as 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). SIFIs are institutions 
whose failure could threaten the financial stability of the United States. 
Companies designated as non-bank SIFIs include AIG, General Electric 
Capital, Prudential Financial, and MetLife.3 A SIFI designation means the 
company comes under the supervision of the Federal Reserve, is subject to 
capital requirements, needs to make regular living wills, and may be subject 
to the Volcker rule.4 It is a big deal, and companies like Blackrock and 
Fidelity Investments have made great efforts to avoid being named non-
bank SIFIs. 
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) determines whether 
or not an institution is a SIFI. They do not have specific rules or metrics to 
determine non-bank SIFIs. In response to calls for more transparency in the 
designation process, the FSOC has said, 
 
Due to the unique threat that each nonbank financial company may 
pose to U.S. financial stability and the qualitative nature of the 
inquiry under the statutory considerations, it is not possible to 
provide broadly applicable metrics defining these channels or to 
identify universally applicable links between the channels and the 
statutory considerations.5 
 
 1.  U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Forms 3, 4, 5, FAST ANSWERS (Jan. 15, 2013),  
https://www.sec.gov/answers/form345.htm. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, DESIGNATIONS, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL 
(2015), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx#nonbank . 
 4.  DELOITTE, SIFI DESIGNATION AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON NONBANK FINANCIAL 
COMPANIES 8-10 (2013). 
 5.  Financial Stability Oversight Council, 77 FED. REG. 70, 21641 (April 11, 2012) (to be 
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In other words, we cannot define a SIFI, but we know one when we see 
it. 
A second well-known and important example of regulator discretion is 
the design of bank stress tests. Dodd-Frank calls for forward-looking stress 
tests for large banks. These tests are simulations of unlikely but plausible 
macroeconomic situations. To pass a stress test, a bank needs to maintain 
minimum capital levels in the simulation. Failure to pass a stress test has 
serious consequences.6 The bank will probably have to cut back or even 
eliminate its dividend to increase its capital. News that a bank has failed a 
stress test, as Citigroup or Zion’s Bancorp did in 2014, is usually 
accompanied by a significant decline in the bank’s stock price. 
Regulator discretion comes into play in the design of the stress test. 
Banks are not given information on the simulated macroeconomic situation 
in advance. They cannot make changes to their balance sheets to help pass 
the stress test. 
I believe that there are two reasons why we are moving toward more 
regulator discretion and away from hard rules. The first is that financial 
markets and institutions are much more complex than they were just a few 
years ago, and financial innovation is taking place at a more rapid rate. 
Complexity and change makes it more difficult to write widely applicable 
rules. 
The second reason for the increased reliance on regulator discretion is 
political. The Federal Reserve, the SEC, the Comptroller of the Currency, 
and other regulators avoided blame for the financial crisis by claiming that 
they either lacked information or lacked authority to prevent the crisis.7 The 
formation of FSOC is intended to make sure regulators have information 
about the financial system as a whole.8 Greater discretion is intended to 
make sure they have the authority to prevent a crisis. 
Advantages of Regulator Discretion Over Hard and Specific Rules 
There are advantages and disadvantages of depending on regulator 
discretion rather than hard rules. One of the advantages of regulator 
discretion is that rules can be gamed. A bank holding company with 
consolidated assets in excess of $50 billion is deemed a SIFI and is subject 
to more stringent regulatory standards and requirements than smaller 
 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310). 
 6.  Peter Eavis, What to Know About Bank Stress Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/04/business/dealbook/05db-stress.html?_r=0. 
 7.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ABOUT FSOC (2015),  
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx. 
 8.  Melissa A. Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Decision 
Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 4, 1 (2010) 
available at https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n4/v70n4p1.html. 
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banks.9 Banks can get around a hard rule like this by selling assets, and 
accountants can do many, many things to reduce the value of their 
consolidated assets below $50 billion. The hard rule can be gamed. On the 
other hand, regulators can simply designate a non-bank financial institution 
as a SIFI. Accounting tricks can’t be used to avoid the designation. 
A second advantage of regulator discretion rather than specific rules is 
that innovation and technological change can be used to eventually 
circumvent rules. ATMs for example, can be thought of as a technological 
innovation that makes banking services more convenient for customers. 
While ATMs do indeed do that, they were also a way to circumvent 
restrictions on bank branch offices. More recently, Dodd-Frank’s new 
margin requirements on swaps have been circumvented through 
“futurization.” That is, much of the swap trading has migrated to futures on 
swaps—an economically equivalent derivative contract with lower margin 
requirements.10 This cycle of financial regulation, innovation, and 
reregulation is termed the regulatory dialectic by Edward Kane.11 Regulator 
discretion can adapt to financial innovation quickly, while rules are 
rewritten with a much longer time lag. 
Finally, an advantage of discretion is that, broadly speaking, rules are 
based on a subset of the information available to the regulator. They do not 
incorporate any special considerations that may apply in a particular case. 
They do not incorporate innovation that has occurred since the rule writing. 
Problems with Regulator Discretion 
There are also significant problems with giving regulators too much 
discretionary power. One is that an absence of specific hard-and-fast rules 
creates uncertainty. For example, banks that are subjected to annual stress 
tests by the Federal Reserve do not know the nature of the stress tests 
beforehand. This eliminates banks’ ability to game the tests, but also creates 
uncertainty. Will they pass? Can they afford to pay a dividend?  Can they 
afford to make an acquisition that will expose them to more risk from Asian 
markets? This uncertainty can affect banks’ business decisions in the weeks 
and months leading up to the stress tests.12 
Another example of uncertainty is in the designation of SIFIs. Because 
it relies on regulator discretion, financial institutions cannot game SIFI 
 
 9.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Section 165 (a)(1) of 
H.R. 4173. 
 10.  JOE RENNISON, Swaps vs futures: OTC market speaks out, Risk (April 3, 2013),  
http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2255770/swaps-vs-futures. 
 11.  Edward J. Kane, Interaction of Financial and Regulatory Innovation, 78 AM. ECON. 
REV. 328, 331-33 (1988). 
 12.  John Hartley, Fed Should Stop the Stress Test Guessing Game, AM. BANKER (March 
13,2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/fed-should-stop-the-stress-test-guessing-
game. 
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designation. At the same time though, they do not have clear guidance on 
how to avoid being named a SIFI. Firms may make costly and unnecessary 
or unsuccessful changes to their businesses in an effort to avoid a SIFI 
designation. 
A second problem with relying on regulator discretion is that 
regulators’ intelligence and judgment, and the information that is available 
to them, is limited. The financial system is very complicated, too 
complicated for any individual to understand completely. It is naïve to 
expect regulators to be able to foresee and prevent all future financial crises. 
They’re not that smart. Nobody is. Giving more discretion to regulators can 
give a false sense of security. 
In retrospect, it is easy to see that mortgage-backed securities were 
overpriced in 2008, and that financial firms that held large quantities of 
them were at risk of failure. Had this been apparent at the time, smart 
investors, say hedge fund managers, could have made many millions of 
dollars betting against mortgage-backed securities. But they did not. 
Richard Fuld, former CEO of Lehman Brothers bet big on mortgage-backed 
securities through Lehman and personally lost almost $1 billion.13 Are 
regulators really smarter than the people on Wall Street that lost money 
during the financial crisis? 
Perhaps the biggest problem with relying on regulator discretion rather 
than hard rules is that it makes it easier for regulators to pursue their own 
self-interest. Giving regulators discretion gives them power. Most use it 
benignly in what they perceive to be the public interest. However, some just 
enjoy wielding power. Alternatively, they can use it to generate publicity 
for themselves to jumpstart a political career. They could do this, for 
example, through high profile enforcements against unpopular financial 
institutions. Or, regulators could use their discretionary powers to extract 
perks or favors from the financial industry, including lucrative jobs in the 
private sector after their regulatory career ends. The financial sector has no 
incentive to curry favor with bureaucratic regulators who merely check 
boxes that rules are met. It is the regulator’s discretion that makes 
businesses attempt to influence him or her. 
Finally, more regulatory discretion means more lobbying and more 
meetings with regulators and politicians. Before rules are written, financial 
firms typically meet with regulators to inform them about the likely impact 
of rules and about alternative measures that could satisfy the regulators’ 
objectives. These activities are costly for both regulators and regulated 
firms. After a rule is written though, the lobbying and meetings are done. 
When regulators have discretion, the meetings never end. 
 
 13.  Steve Fishman, Burning Down His House, N. Y.  MAG. (Nov. 30, 2008),  
http://nymag.com/news/business/52630. 
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BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND CHANGING REGULATORY OBJECTIVES 
The Approaches of Traditional and Behavioral Economics Toward 
Regulation 
The second change in our approach to financial regulation is, I believe, 
a result of the increasing acceptance of behavioral economics. Traditional 
economic theory assumes individuals are rational. Economists, of course, 
know that people are not always rational, but rationality is a good 
approximation and markets push people toward rational choices.  The 
assumption of rationality allows economists to produce useful models of 
markets and economic behavior that yield clear predictions. 
The traditional economic rationale for financial regulation is to remedy 
market failures. A familiar example is bank runs. Banks get funds from 
checking and saving accounts that can be withdrawn at any time. They 
invest in mortgages and other illiquid long-term assets. Suppose that 
depositors believe a bank is sound but fear that other depositors think it is 
insolvent. Depositors have an incentive to withdraw money before others. If 
they wait, the bank may not have cash and may not be able to give them 
their money until they sell mortgages. If the bank has to sell its illiquid 
assets quickly, it may not be able to get the full value for them. Depositors 
may only receive a portion of their money back. So, a perfectly safe, solvent 
bank can be driven out of business by a bank run. 
This market failure is resolved by FDIC insurance. When depositors 
know their accounts are fully insured, the incentives for bank runs 
disappear. This market distortion creates other problems though, which 
require additional regulations. With deposit insurance, banks can borrow 
cheaply regardless of how many risks they take in their mortgages and other 
investments. This heads-we-win, tails-the-FDIC-loses situation creates an 
incentive for banks to take inappropriate risks. So, among other things, 
regulations limit the investments banks can make and the capital they must 
hold. 
The previous example illustrated financial regulation based on 
traditional economics and its assumption that bank depositors are rational. 
Behavioral economics, on the other hand, has its roots in psychology.14 
Work in behavioral economics and behavioral finance demonstrates that 
investors have limited cognitive abilities and numerous clear biases in the 
way they process information and assess probabilities.15 Individuals, for 
example, are overconfident about both their abilities and their knowledge. 
 
 14.  Nizan G. Packin, It’s (Not) All About the Money: Using Behavioral Economics to 
Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L., 419, 450 
(2013). 
 15.  Melissa A. Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Decision 
Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOC. SEC. BULL., Nov. 2010 at 7. 
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They are also affected by anchoring, a fact that is well known to skilled 
negotiators.16 If negotiations to buy a car start at the sticker price, they are 
anchored there and the final price will be higher than if negotiations start at 
the price the dealership paid for the car. Framing, or how a decision is 
presented, also affects individuals’ decisions. Equivalent choices described 
in slightly different ways lead individuals to take different actions. 
Behavioral researchers have also discovered biases in the way that 
individuals assess probabilities. The likelihood of low probability events is 
usually overestimated. Individuals ignore base rates. They are unable to 
update probabilities correctly when new information is received. They 
sometimes claim that both event A and event B occurring is more likely 
than event A. Behavioral economics has been characterized as a “theory of 
errors.”17 
These findings are but a handful of the reasons why individuals can be 
expected to make suboptimal decisions. Traditional economics says that 
regulation is needed because markets fail under certain circumstances. 
Behavioral economics says that regulation is needed because individuals 
consistently fail to make good financial decisions. 
So, behavioral economics suggests that protecting investors or other 
financial decision makers is an important reason for regulation. Traditional 
financial regulation has also tried to protect investors. To achieve this, the 
SEC’s long-time approach has been to insure that companies release 
complete and accurate information in a timely manner.18 Behavioral finance 
would hold that this is not enough. Even with accurate and timely 
information, investors make bad decisions. Instead, regulators can improve 
welfare with paternalistic policies that force individuals to make specific 
financial decisions. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Paternalism 
Consider, for a moment, hard paternalism where regulators determine 
what is best for individuals. There are some positive things to be said about 
this approach to financial regulation. It may prevent some people from 
making bad decisions. It may save individuals the time that it takes to 
become informed about financial products that they would ultimately reject. 
Many people have philosophical problems with paternalism. They see it 
as a threat to liberty. They believe that controlling one’s own destiny, much 
more than making correct financial decisions, is essential for happiness. 
These are important issues, but we will not address them here. Instead, we 
 
 16.  Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by Another Name; The Challenge of Purely Speculative 
Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN., 67, 90 (2011). 
 17.  Joshua Wright & Douglas Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: its Origins, Fatal 
Flaws and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV., 1033, 1040 (2013). 
 18.  15 U.S.C. § 78q (2016). 
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will discuss why paternalistic regulations that prevent individuals from 
making some financial decisions or using some financial products may not 
yield the best financial outcomes. 
One problem is that regulators do not have all the information about 
individuals’ situations that the individuals themselves possess. Individuals 
make decisions based on the particulars of their current situation. A 
financial product that may be inferior for most people on most occasions 
may in fact be right for some individuals at some times. So, in some cases, 
policy may attempt to correct seemingly irrational decisions that are, in fact, 
rational when all of the facts of a person’s situation are known. It may also 
place costly restrictions on rational people from policies designed to help 
the irrational.19 
A second problem is that regulators are afflicted with the same 
psychological biases that plague everybody else. These biases may be 
diminished by the regulators’ expertise and experience, or because the 
regulator can be more objective in recommendations to others than people 
can be when making their own decisions. On the other hand, people 
overestimate their own competence and underestimate the competence of 
others. Regulators are not immune to this bias. And people just love to tell 
other people what to do. This suggests that regulators may not hesitate to 
promote financial products that may not, in fact, be optimal for the 
particular person or situation. 
Another problem of paternalistic regulation is that it may discourage 
innovation. Banks and other financial companies may be reluctant to create 
new products that may not be approved by regulators or that might be 
subject to a long approval process. They may also be reluctant to create 
financial products that are useful for some people but may be misused by 
others. 
Finally, if paternalism pushes individuals into particular financial 
products or services, it may prevent them from gathering information about 
alternatives. At first blush, this seems like an advantage of paternalism. 
After all, why should multiple people bear the cost of becoming informed 
rather than a regulator bearing the cost once for everybody? But, people are 
different and have different needs. Furthermore, they pass information on to 
each other. One person’s choice to become informed may provide positive 
externalities to many people.20 
Some of these problems of paternalism can be overcome if regulators 
allow individuals to make their own financial choices but “nudge” them 
toward making what the regulators believe to be the best ones. Cass 
 
 19.  Id. at 1049. 
 20.  Bruce Ian Carlin, Simon Gervais & Gustavo Manso, Libertarian Paternalism, 
Information Production, and Financial Decision Making, 26 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 2204, 2206 n.9 
(2013). 
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Sunstein, an advisor to the Obama Administration, and Richard Thaler, one 
of the founders of behavioral economics, make the case for what they refer 
to as “Libertarian Paternalism.”21 In their view, individuals can be “nudged” 
toward making wise decisions while giving them the choice to opt out and 
make other choices. An example would be the choice of contributions to 
401(k) plans. Most plans allow employees to opt in to the plan, but Sunstein 
and Thaler argue that they are more likely to make the correct choice of 
contributing to a 401(k) plan if they have to actively choose to opt out.22 
Sunstein and Thaler present a subtle argument for Libertarian 
Paternalism. The way in which employers, investment advisors, or financial 
institutions present choices has a strong effect on what individuals do 
regardless of the actual information presented about the choices. Regulators 
can nudge individuals to make good decisions by requiring certain “choice 
architectures.” So, for example, making a choice a default choice will 
increase the likelihood that individuals will choose it. Some choice 
architecture must be used. Under these circumstances, why not make the 
best choice the default? 
Sunstein claims as a “first law of behaviorally informed regulation: In 
the face of behavioral market failures, disclosure of information, warnings, 
default rules, and other kinds of nudges are usually the best response, at 
least when there is no harm to others.”23 While Sunstein is clearly a 
proponent of paternalistic regulation, he recognizes objections to it. He 
recognizes that many people feel autonomy is a desirable thing but claims 
that most efforts to remedy “behavioral market failures” do not interfere 
with autonomy, “rightly understood.”24 Hard paternalism is defined as 
“actions by government that attempt to improve people’s own welfare by 
imposing material costs on their choices.” Soft paternalism is “actions of 
government that attempt to improve people’s own welfare by influencing 
their choices without imposing material costs on those choices.”25 Sunstein 
believes that soft paternalism, in the form of libertarian paternalism, can 
preserve individuals’ autonomy while protecting them from their own 
mistakes. 
Smith and Zywicki, on the other hand, suggest that what is a gentle 
nudge in theory, becomes a hard shove in practice.26 Regulators may find it 
easier to force people into particular choices. 
 
 21.  Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70 
U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159 n.4 (2003). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Cass Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE 
L.J. 1826, 1835 (2013). 
 24.  Id. at 1837. 
 25.  Id. at 1860. 
 26.  Adam Smith & Todd Zywicki, Behavior, Paternalism and Policy: Evaluating Consumer 
Financial Protection, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 201, 211-12 (2015). 
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In the last few years, libertarian paternalism has gained enormous 
influence in Washington. In part, this is because libertarian paternalism has 
been articulately defended in a number of well-cited academic papers. In 
addition, proponents of this view have occupied prominent regulatory 
positions. For example, Sunstein headed the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs in the Executive Office of the President. 
REGULATORY TRENDS AND THE CFPB 
The CFPB was established in the Dodd-Frank bill. Both of the trends 
that we have discussed, regulator discretion rather than hard rules and 
paternalism informed by behavioral economics, have been incorporated into 
the CFPB’s approach to regulation since its beginning.27 
“Making Credit Safer,” an article by Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth 
Warren, is generally acknowledged to be the intellectual father of the 
CFPB.28 It calls for the creation of a new regulatory agency with “broad 
rulemaking and enforcement authority over consumer credit products.”29 
The CFPB was always conceived of as an agency in which powerful 
regulators had broad powers to determine acceptable financial products and 
practices. Regulation of consumer finance, which had been spread across a 
number of regulators, was to be concentrated here. 
In arguing the need for an independent agency to regulate consumer 
financial products, Bar-Gill and Warren rely on both traditional economic 
arguments and arguments from behavioral economics. They observe that it 
may be costly for consumers to become informed about financial products. 
By itself, this is not a large problem. Consumers invest in information until 
the expected benefit from investing more is offset by the cost. But Bar-Gill 
and Warren also note that consumers are imperfectly rational. They may, 
for example, forego information about credit card late fees in the mistaken 
belief that they will never make a late payment. 
The CFPB and Regulator Discretion 
From the start, the CFPB was always envisioned as a regulator with 
broad discretionary powers. The original Bar-Gill and Warren article notes 
that “legislation targeted to specific practices . . . is incapable of effectively 
responding to the high rate of innovation in consumer credit markets and 
the subtle ways in which creditors can exploit consumer 
misunderstanding.”30 In other words, individuals cannot be protected unless 
 
 27.  CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
BUREAU OUTLINES BANK SUPERVISION APPROACH (2011),  
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-outlines-bank-
supervision-approach/. 
 28.  Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 29.  Id. at 99. 
 30.  Making Credit Safer, supra note 30, at 100. 
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regulators have discretionary powers. 
The CFPB has the power to regulate “unfair, deceptive, or abusive 
product(s).”31 These vague, general terms give the CFPB the power to 
regulate many things. The term abusive, in particular, can be used to give 
broad discretionary powers to the CFPB. The terms unfair and deceptive 
have history and precedents in regulation. Abusive is new. It will ultimately 
be defined through enforcement actions that lead to court rulings. In the 
meantime, the CFPB decides which policies or practices are abusive, and 
can bring enforcement actions based on their judgment. 
The CFPB interprets its broad mandate to include virtually any 
financial practice that can be construed as detrimental to individuals. The 
CFPB’s Education Loan Examination Procedures manual states that, “[t]o 
carry out the objectives set forth in the Examination Objectives section, the 
examination process also will include assessing other risks to consumers 
that are not governed by specific statutory or regulatory provisions.”32 
The broad discretion given to CFPB regulators to pursue their mandate 
creates tremendous uncertainty for financial institutions.33 It is difficult to 
know in advance which products and services will be deemed abusive and 
which will be allowed. In some cases, it is likely that this uncertainty will 
prevent financial firms from providing products or services that would be 
useful to their customers. 
An example of the CFPB’s regulatory discretion in action comes from 
the CFPB’s attempt to regulate auto dealers.34 In drafting the Dodd-Frank 
bill, Congress carved out auto dealers from the CFPB’s jurisdiction. There 
are not good reasons for doing this. Auto loans represent a large portion of 
consumer debt. But auto dealers lobbied effectively and the Dodd-Frank bill 
clearly specifies that they are exempt from CFPB regulation. 
So, the CFPB has sought to regulate auto dealers indirectly by 
regulating lenders who work with auto dealers. When auto dealers arrange 
financing for car buyers, they typically arrange for a loan from a bank and 
then mark up the interest rate, so car buyers who arrange financing through 
a dealer pay more than the rate charged by the lender. A concern for the 
CFPB has been the interest rate markup charged by dealers above the 
interest rate charged by the lender. 
In March 2013, the agency released a bulletin that warned lenders that 
they would be responsible if auto dealers discriminated on loan interest 
 
 31.  12 U.S.C. §5536(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2011). 
 32.  CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU EXAMINATION PROCEDURES, 
EDUCATION LOANS 7 (Dec. 2013). 
 33.  See Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856 (2013). 
 34.  Rachel Witkowski, The Inside Story of the CFPB’s Battle Over Auto Lending, AM. 
BANKER (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/the-inside-story-
of-the-cfpbs-battle-over-auto-lending-1076940-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1. 
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rates on the basis of race.35 The race of the loan applicant is recorded on 
mortgage forms but not on auto loan forms. Lenders do not know the race 
of the loan applicant. Neither, for that matter, does the CFPB. They instead 
rely on statistical models based on demographics to predict the applicant’s 
race and use a disparate impact analysis to determine if minority borrowers 
were being charged more for car loans. They have crafted a proxy method 
based on demographics to determine the race of a borrower. 
Here is where the use of discretion rather than rules comes into play. 
Rather than issuing a rule so that lenders can avoid being charged with 
discriminatory lending, the CFPB is considering some enforcement actions 
against lenders. If a rule was issued they would have to make it publicly 
available and their methodology would be described and subject to scrutiny. 
In addition, the precarious legal basis for their enforcement would be 
revealed. They are, after all, not supposed to regulate auto dealers. 
Here, the costs of discretion are clear. Lenders are not given 
information that allows them to structure their compliance to avoid 
discrimination charges. This uncertainty makes them reluctant to loan 
money. From the standpoint of the lender, the way to avoid legal action is 
for the auto dealer to charge the same interest rate on each loan. That 
appears to be the CFPB’s objective. 
Giving regulators discretion always carries with it the possibility of 
abuse. Mark Seidenfeld believes that in many cases, the advantages of 
regulator discretion outweigh this risk as long as the regulator is subject to 
ex-post review.36 The CFPB has been set up in such a way though that it is 
subject to almost no political oversight. It is run by one director rather than 
five commissioners like the SEC or Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC).37 It is housed in the Federal Reserve and is not 
subject to congressional budgetary review.38 Its rulings can only be 
overturned by a two-thirds vote of the FSOC, and only if the rule threatens 
the financial stability of the United States.39 
The CFPB and Paternalism 
Behavioral economics has been baked into the CFPB from the 
beginning. The foundational article by Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren 
speaks of the need to protect imperfectly rational consumers.40 Behavioral 
 
 35.  CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB BULLETIN 2013-02 (2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf. 
 36.  Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency 
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV., 429, 432 (1999). 
 37.  Adam Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 340 (2013). 
 38.  Id. at 339. 
 39.  Id. at 353. 
 40.  Making Credit Safer, supra note 30, at 157. 
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views are well represented at the CFPB. 
The academic advisory board for the CFPB, which is composed of first-
rate scholars, includes behavioralists Richard Thaler and Christine Jolls, a 
coauthor of Sunstein and Thaler.41 
Dodd-Frank authorizes the CFPB to prohibit abusive acts and 
practices.42 A recent article by Patrick Corrigan contends that the abuse 
authority gives the CFPB the power to regulate problems arising from 
irrationality of the type documented by behavioral economics.43 The FTC 
has long worked to prevent unfair and deceptive practices, but the term 
abusive is new.44 It is not defined in the law, but section 1031(d) provides 
minimum standards to the CFPB to apply the law.45 The CFPB can only 
declare a product or service to be abusive if it: 
 
(1)materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand 
a term or condition of a consumer financial product or services; or 
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of—(A) a lack of understanding 
on the part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or 
conditions of the product or service; (B) the inability of the 
consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or 
using a consumer financial product or service; or (C) the reasonable 
reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the interests 
of the consumer.46 
 
Inability to understand a product, or to protect one’s own interests is, of 
course, a major concern of behavioral economics. 
Many of the CFPB’s actions appear to be motivated by paternalism. For 
example, the CFPB believes individuals have trouble understanding their 
credit cards and seeks to make them more understandable. On their website, 
the CFPB says, “A credit card agreement describes the structures and 
features of a credit card. We believe that it is important to make them less 
complicated so that consumers can better understand their credit cards.” 
They propose a standardized two-page form.47 
The CFPB also takes a paternalistic view of mortgages. Mortgages that 
 
 41.  Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1545 (1998). 
 42.  12 U.S.C. § 5511 (b)(2). 
 43.  Patrick M. Corrigan, “Abusive” Acts and Practices: Dodd-Frank’s Behaviorally 
Informed Authority Over Consumer Credit Markets and Its Application to Teaser Rates, 18 
N.Y.U. J. OF LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y, 125, 146 (2015). 
 44.  Levitin, supra note 39, at 337. 
 45.  12 U.S.C. § 5531(d). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CREDIT CARDS (2015),  
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
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meet certain standards are “qualified mortgages.”48 Qualifying a loan makes 
it more difficult to hold the lender liable for failing to make a “reasonable, 
good faith determination of a consumer’s ability to repay.”49 Hence from 
the standpoint of lenders, a big advantage of writing qualified mortgages is 
that it provides a safe harbor from some kinds of lawsuits. Restrictions on 
mortgages that allow them to be deemed qualified mortgages include: 1) no 
negative amortization or interest only payments, 2) no balloon payments, 3) 
loan term of 30 years or less, 4) a 3% cap on fees and points, and 5) the 
borrower’s debt-to-income (DTI) must be 43% or less.50 
Here, the gentle nudge becomes a hard push. There are good reasons for 
some borrowers to take out mortgages with these provisions. A 40-year 
mortgage, for example, can reduce monthly payments to a level that allows 
a borrower to easily make payments. A debt-to-income ratio greater than 
43% may be acceptable for a borrower whose income is expected to 
increase, or who has a lot of assets. The CFPB does not prevent borrowers 
from taking out mortgages with these provisions, but since they are not 
qualified mortgages, lenders will be more likely to be sued. 
A second part of being a qualified mortgage is that the lender must 
establish the borrower’s ability to repay. The CFPB’s ability-to-pay rule 
went into affect in January 2014.51  Under this rule, for a mortgage to be 
qualified, creditors must consider eight underwriting factors for a 
residential mortgage loan to assess the borrower’s ability to repay the loan: 
1) current or reasonably expected income or assets, 2) current employment 
status, 3) the monthly payment on the mortgage, 4) the monthly payment on 
other loans, 5) the monthly payment for mortgage-related obligations, 6) 
current debt obligations, alimony, and child support, 7) the monthly debt-to-
income ratio or residual income, and 8) credit history.52 
It is hard to understand the logic behind an ability-to-pay rule. Perhaps 
borrowers lack the mental capacity to determine whether they will be able 
to make mortgage payments. Lenders, however, should be able to make that 
determination. Banks do not make money by making loans that are not 
repaid. They have every incentive to make sure loans are repaid. 
Furthermore, they have experience and expertise in determining the 
 
 48.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2). 
 49.  CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, WHAT IS A QUALIFIED MORTGAGE? 
(2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1789/what-qualified-mortgage.html. 
 50.  How Prospective and Current Homeowners Will Be Harmed by the CFPB’s Qualified 
Mortgage Rule: Before the H. Fin. Services Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit, 113th Cong. 5 (2014) (statement of Daniel Weickenand, CEO, Orion Federal Credit 
Union). 
 51.  CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ABILITY TO REPAY AND QUALIFIED 
MORTGAGE STANDARDS UNDER THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (REGULATION Z) (2013), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/ability-to-repay-and-qualified-mortgage-standards-
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 52.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(2). 
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likelihood that loans will be repaid. So, the ability-to-pay rule seems likely 
to create extra paperwork and an extra regulatory burden on lenders. It may 
also prevent banks from making loans to customers who they expect to be 
able to repay but do not meet the one-size-fits-all criteria established by the 
CFPB. 
THE CFPB AND CONSUMER BANKING 
Even without its paternalism and its regulatory discretion, the CFPB 
can be expected to impose significant costs on the banking sector. Financial 
firms with total assets of more than $10 billion will undergo annual 
examinations by the CFPB.  Version 2 of the CFPB Examination manual 
(October, 2012) is 924 pages long.53 There are a number of other manuals 
covering specific aspects of the examination. Financial institutions with less 
than $10 billion in assets are exempt from examination, but not from other 
rules. Among other things, they, like larger institutions, are subject to 
Section 1026 of Dodd-Frank which authorizes the CFPB to ‘require 
reports . . . as necessary’ to support its mission.54 
The CFPB’s regulation by discretion rather than rules is likely to 
impose additional costs on the banking sector. Recently, Jim Purcell, 
President of the State National Bank of Big Spring Texas complained, 
 
Dodd-Frank imposes immense regulatory costs upon community 
banks, costs that are exacerbated by the CFPB’s persistently, 
inherently regulatory uncertainty.” “As the CFPB’s own web site 
shows, its rulemakings are the subject of constant significant 
revision – and that’s when the CFPB bothers with express 
rulemakings at all, instead of regulating informally through case-
by-case ‘guidance’ and enforcement proceedings.55 
 
Finally, the CFPB’s paternalistic approach to regulation will make it 
harder for financial institutions to offer nonstandard or complex financial 
products. Marsh and Norman contend that, 
 
A recurring theme in Dodd-Frank, particularly with respect to the 
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, is that standardization of 
financial products and forms will protect consumers. This is 
implicitly a reaction to the narrative that one of the causes of the 
financial crisis was the inability of parties to understand and 
appreciate the risks of innovative financial products. But the focus 
on standardization of consumer financial products, like home loans 
and checking accounts, fails to recognize the value to consumers of 
the community banking model, which emphasizes relationship 
banking, personalized underwriting, and customization of financial 
products to meet the specific needs of customers and 
communities.56 
 
Yogi Berra is alleged to have said, “Prediction is difficult. Especially 
when it concerns the future.”57 The CFPB is relatively new and its impact 
on the financial sector is difficult to predict. It may well be successful in 
reducing the frequency of poor financial decisions by consumers. But that 
will come at a cost. Its paternalism and its discretionary enforcement is 
likely to eliminate financial product and services that are useful and 
appropriate for some individuals. It is likely to slow financial innovation. It 
will also impose large compliance costs on banks and other financial 
institutions, costs that smaller institutions may find difficult to bear. 
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